Public Information is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections

Banerjee, Abhijit; Enevoldsen, Nils; Pande, Rohini; Walton, Michael

doi:10.1257/app.20220088

Abstract

Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councilors learned that they had been randomly chosen for a pre-election newspaper report card. Treated councilors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councilors' high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councilors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed.

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Public Information is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections

Abstract

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