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  5. Coordination and Bandwagon Effects: How Past Rankings Shape the Behavior of Voters and Candidates

Coordination and Bandwagon Effects: How Past Rankings Shape the Behavior of Voters and Candidates

Abstract

Candidates’ placements in polls and past elections can be powerful coordination devices for parties and voters. Using an RDD in French two-round elections, we show that candidates who place first in the first round are more likely to stay in the race and win than those placed second. These effects are even larger for ranking second versus third, and also present for third versus fourth. They stem from allied parties agreeing on which candidate should drop out, voters coordinating their choice, and the “bandwagon effect” of wanting to vote for the winner. We find similar results across 19 other countries.

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