Informed Enforcement: Lessons from Pollution Monitoring in China
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 16,
no. 1, January 2024
(pp. 213-52)
Abstract
Government regulations are often imperfectly enforced by public officials. In this study, we exploit the introduction of air pollution monitors in China to investigate whether real-time monitoring of policy outcomes affects the enforcement of existing regulations. Using assignment criteria established by the central government and new georeferenced data on local enforcement activities, we show that monitoring (i) increases enforcement against local firms, (ii) improves the targeting of enforcement, and (iii) reduces aggregate pollution. These effects are driven by officials facing performance incentives and are stronger when there is limited scope for data manipulation, suggesting that real-time monitoring improves top-down accountability.Citation
Axbard, Sebastian, and Zichen Deng. 2024. "Informed Enforcement: Lessons from Pollution Monitoring in China." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 16 (1): 213-52. DOI: 10.1257/app.20210386Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- K32 Environmental, Energy, Health, and Safety Law
- L51 Economics of Regulation
- O13 Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
- P25 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
- P28 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Natural Resources; Energy; Environment
- Q52 Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
- Q53 Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
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