Compliance Behavior in Networks: Evidence from a Field Experiment
- (pp. 96-133)
Abstract
This paper studies the spread of compliance behavior in neighborhood networks in Austria. We exploit a field experiment that varied the content of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. The data reveal a strong treatment spillover: untreated households are more likely to switch from evasion to compliance in response to mailings received by their network neighbors. Digging deeper into the properties of the spillover, we find that it is concentrated among close neighbors of the targets and increases with the treated households' diffusion centrality. Local concentration of equally treated households implies a lower spillover.Citation
Drago, Francesco, Friederike Mengel, and Christian Traxler. 2020. "Compliance Behavior in Networks: Evidence from a Field Experiment." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 12 (2): 96-133. DOI: 10.1257/app.20170690Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C93 Field Experiments
- D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D85 Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- L82 Entertainment; Media
- L88 Industry Studies: Services: Government Policy
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
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