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  3. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
  4. April 2018
  5. Financial Incentives and the Fertility-Sex Ratio Trade-Off

Financial Incentives and the Fertility-Sex Ratio Trade-Off

  • S Anukriti
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 10, no. 2, April 2018
(pp. 27-57)
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Abstract

Can financial incentives resolve the fertility-sex ratio trade-off faced by countries with persistent son preference and easy access to sex-selection technology? An Indian program, Devi Rupak, that seeks to lower fertility and the sex ratio is unable to do so. Although fertility decreases, the sex ratio at birth worsens as high son preference families are unwilling to forgo a son despite substantially higher benefits for a daughter. Thus, financial incentives may only play a limited role in the resolution of the fertility-sex ratio conflict.

Citation

Anukriti, S. 2018. "Financial Incentives and the Fertility-Sex Ratio Trade-Off." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 10 (2): 27-57. DOI: 10.1257/app.20150234

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • I38 Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
  • J13 Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
  • J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
  • J18 Demographic Economics: Public Policy
  • O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
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