We analyze data from a field experiment in which an auto repair firm provided checklists to mechanics and monitored their use. Revenue was 20 percent higher during the experiment, and the effect is equivalent to that of a 1.6 percentage point (10 percent) commission increase. Checklists appear to boost productivity by serving both as a memory aid and a monitoring technology. Despite the large benefits to the firm, mechanics did not use checklists without the firm directly monitoring their use. We show that a moral hazard can explain why mechanics do not otherwise adopt checklists. (JEL C93, D82, L25, L81)
Jackson, C. Kirabo, and Henry S. Schneider.
"Checklists and Worker Behavior: A Field Experiment."
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce