Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?
- (pp. 1544-75)
Abstract
We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But preemptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry -- precisely because of its inefficiency -- it usually generates higher expected revenue. We also discuss the effects of lock-ups, matching rights, break-up fees (as in takeover battles), entry subsidies, etc. (JEL D44, G34, L13)Citation
Bulow, Jeremy, and Paul Klemperer. 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?" American Economic Review, 99 (4): 1544-75. DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1544JEL Classification
- D44 Auctions
- G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
- L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets