Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions
- (pp. 1486-1529)
Abstract
We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may be restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in simulations and applied to school choice in Paris. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings.Citation
Fack, Gabrielle, Julien Grenet, and Yinghua He. 2019. "Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions." American Economic Review, 109 (4): 1486-1529. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20151422Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D11 Consumer Economics: Theory
- D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I23 Higher Education; Research Institutions