Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy
- (pp. 431-35)
AbstractWe study the design of mechanisms satisfying a novel desideratum: privacy. This requires the mechanism not reveal "much" about any agent's type to other agents. We propose the notion of joint differential privacy: a variant of differential privacy used in the privacy literature. We show by construction that mechanisms satisfying our desiderata exist when there are a large number of players, and any player's action affects any other's payoff by at most a small amount. Our results imply that in large economies, privacy concerns of agents can be accommodated at no additional "cost" to standard incentive concerns.
Citation2014. "Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy." American Economic Review, 104(5): 431-35. DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.431
- C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design