Social Ideology and Taxes in a Differentiated Candidates Framework
- (pp. 308-22)
AbstractMany observers argue that political polarization, particularly on social and cultural issues, has increased in the United States. How does this influence the political competition on economic issues? We analyze this question using a framework in which two officemotivated candidates differ in their fixed ideological position and choose a level of government spending to maximize their vote share. In equilibrium, candidates cater to a set of swing voters who contain socially conservative and economically-liberal voters, as well as socially-liberal and economically-conservative voters. We analyze how voters' cultural preferences and candidates' cultural positions influence equilibrium economic positions.
CitationKrasa, Stefan, and Mattias Polborn. 2014. "Social Ideology and Taxes in a Differentiated Candidates Framework." American Economic Review, 104 (1): 308-22. DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.1.308
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- E62 Fiscal Policy
- H50 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
- Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification