American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Cross-State Strategic Voting
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
(pp. 159–89)
Abstract
We estimate that 3.1 percent of US voters, or 6.1 million individuals, were registered to vote in two states in 2020, opening up the possibility for them to choose where to vote. Double registrants are concentrated in the wealthiest zip codes and respond to both incentives and costs, disproportionately choosing to vote in swing states (higher incentive) and states that automatically send out mail-in ballots (lower cost). We call this behavior Cross-State Strategic Voting. While others have documented strategic incentives on who to vote for, this paper is the first to consider strategic incentives on where to vote.Citation
Dahl, Gordon B., Joseph Engelberg, Runjing Lu, and William Mullins. 2026. "Cross-State Strategic Voting." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 18 (1): 159–89. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20240630Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K16 Election Law