AEA Papers and Proceedings
ISSN 2574-0768 (Print) | ISSN 2574-0776 (Online)
Can Sanctions Deter Wars? The Russia-Ukraine Case
AEA Papers and Proceedings
(pp. 114–118)
Abstract
Our paper simulates a model of trade, diplomacy, and wars, calibrated to be relevant for analyzing the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The quantitative results show that Ukraine’s decoupling from Russia after the 2014 annexation of Crimea reduced its economic exposure to war but also increased the likelihood of conflict by lowering its opportunity cost of war. We then simulate sanction scenarios and find that the 2024 package, if credibly announced in 2021 and made contingent on further aggression, would have significantly raised Russia’s cost of war and could have deterred the 2022 invasion.Citation
Mayer, Thierry, Isabelle Méjean, and Mathias Thoenig. 2026. "Can Sanctions Deter Wars? The Russia-Ukraine Case." AEA Papers and Proceedings 116: 114–118. DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20261071Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- F12 Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F13 Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F51 International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
- P26 Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems; Property Rights
- P33 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: International Trade, Finance, Investment, Relations, and Aid