American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 88–122)
Abstract
We analyze the dynamic assignment of objects to agents organized in a constant size waiting list. Applications include the assignment of social housing and organs for transplants. We analyze the optimal design of probabilistic queuing disciplines, punishment schemes, and information release. With private values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to the lottery, but waste is lower at the lottery. With common values, all agents prefer first-come first-served to any other mechanism, and waste is minimized at the lottery. Punishment schemes accelerate turnover in the queue and information release increases the value of agents at the top of the waiting list.Citation
Bloch, Francis, and David Cantala. 2017. "Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 9 (1): 88–122. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150183Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D44 Auctions
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design