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We study reporting responses to the contribution-benefit link in
the context of parental benefits in Hungary and Latvia. Earnings
and employment patterns show pre-pregnancy under-reporting followed
by partial formalization. During pregnancy, the share of
Hungarian women reporting the minimum wage falls from 35% to
26%, and 15% start reporting exactly twice the minimum wage,
the benefit-maximizing threshold. At small firms, earnings rise 5%
in Hungary and 21% in Latvia during pregnancy, and the magnitude
of the response tracks changing incentives. Linking benefits
to contributions when earnings are under-reported reduces evasion
but can impose net fiscal costs depending on program design.