By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.
Telephone service for the AEA administrative office is temporarily unavailable. For ASSA inquiries, email assa@vanderbilt.edu. For AEA inquiries, email aeainfo@vanderbilt.edu. If you do not have access to email, please call the publications office at 412-432-2300.
This paper investigates how federal oversight not precipitated by a major scandal influences
policing behavior and public safety. The high-profile events triggering such
scandals can independently affect policing and crime, confounding estimates of oversight
effects. I examine a 2011 federal investigation into the Seattle Police Department.
In response to the heightened scrutiny from the investigation, officers immediately and
significantly reduced stops, particularly suspicious-activity and traffic stops in minority
neighborhoods. These reductions had no detectable effect on public safety. I conclude
that federal oversight implemented in the absence of scandals may lower the social cost
of policing.