American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies, and Electoral Accountability
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
(pp. 135–62)
Abstract
This paper studies the conditions under which legislators promote policies that may be unpopular in the short term but yield long-term benefits. Using data on the universe of federal disaster declarations from 1989 to 2020, we document that representatives from congressional districts impacted by hurricanes are more inclined to support environmental legislation addressing climate change. However, this response depends on political circumstances: Only those in safe seats can change their political agenda toward policies that involve short-term costs for long-term gains. These results highlight the role of electoral incentives in shaping politicians' attitudes toward farsighted policymaking.Citation
Gagliarducci, Stefano, M. Daniele Paserman, and Eleonora Patacchini. 2026. "Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies, and Electoral Accountability." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 18 (3): 135–62. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20230070Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Q54 Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
- Q58 Environmental Economics: Government Policy