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We study a two-period commodity market with competitive consumers and Cournot sellers.
Without speculation, equilibrium is stationary. A storage-capable, strategically large speculator
can profitably create deterministic intertemporal price dispersion using standard order
types. A period-1 limit buy order flattens residual demand, induces higher output, and yields
a low purchase price. With mandatory liquidation, resale remains below the no-speculation
price but above the purchase price, so the speculator profits; consumers gain and sellers lose.
With free disposal and a stop-loss, the period-2 price can exceed the benchmark, benefiting
sellers but harming consumers.
