American Economic Review: Vol. 104 No. 5 (May 2014)

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Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy

Article Citation

Kearns, Michael, Mallesh M. Pai, Aaron Roth, and Jonathan Ullman. 2014. "Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy." American Economic Review, 104(5): 431-35.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.431

Abstract

We study the design of mechanisms satisfying a novel desideratum: privacy. This requires the mechanism not reveal "much" about any agent's type to other agents. We propose the notion of joint differential privacy: a variant of differential privacy used in the privacy literature. We show by construction that mechanisms satisfying our desiderata exist when there are a large number of players, and any player's action affects any other's payoff by at most a small amount. Our results imply that in large economies, privacy concerns of agents can be accommodated at no additional "cost" to standard incentive concerns.

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Authors

Kearns, Michael (U PA)
Pai, Mallesh M. (U PA)
Roth, Aaron (U PA)
Ullman, Jonathan (Harvard U)

JEL Classifications

C70: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
D82: Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design


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