American Economic Review: Vol. 103 No. 2 (April 2013)


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Inferring Strategic Voting

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Kawai, Kei, and Yasutora Watanabe. 2013. "Inferring Strategic Voting." American Economic Review, 103(2): 624-62.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.2.624


We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction (63.4 percent, 84.9 percent) of strategic voters, only a small fraction (1.4 percent, 4.2 percent) of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies. (JEL D72)

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Kawai, Kei (NYU)
Watanabe, Yasutora (Northwestern U)

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D72: Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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