American Economic Review: Vol. 104 No. 5 (May 2014)

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Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps

Article Citation

Perez-Richet, Eduardo. 2014. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps." American Economic Review, 104(5): 469-74.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.469

Abstract

This paper makes a first attempt at building a theory of interim Bayesian persuasion. I work in a minimalist model where a low or high type sender seeks validation from a receiver who is willing to validate high types exclusively. After learning her type, the sender chooses a complete conditional information structure for the receiver from a possibly restricted feasible set. I suggest a solution to this game that takes into account the signaling potential of the sender's choice.

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Authors

Perez-Richet, Eduardo (Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau)

JEL Classifications

D82: Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D83: Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief


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