This setting lets you change the way you view articles. You can choose to have articles open in a dialog window, a new tab, or directly in the same window.
Open in Dialog
Open in New Tab
Open in same window

American Economic Review: Vol. 102 No. 7 (December 2012)

Expand

Quick Tools:

Print Article Summary
Export Citation
Sign up for Email Alerts Follow us on Twitter

Explore:

AER - All Issues

AER Forthcoming Articles

Political Aid Cycles

Article Citation

Faye, Michael, and Paul Niehaus. 2012. "Political Aid Cycles." American Economic Review, 102(7): 3516-30.

DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.7.3516

Abstract

Researchers have scrutinized foreign aid's effects on poverty and growth, but anecdotal evidence suggests that donors often use aid for other ends. We test whether donors use bilateral aid to influence elections in developing countries. We find that recipient country administrations closely aligned with a donor receive more aid during election years, while those less aligned receive less. Consistent with our interpretation, this effect holds only in competitive elections, is absent in US aid flows to non-government entities, and is driven by bilateral alignment rather than incumbent characteristics.

Article Full-Text Access

Full-text Article

Additional Materials

Download Data Set (141.13 MB) | Online Appendix (1.10 MB)

Authors

Faye, Michael (New York NY)
Niehaus, Paul (U CA, San Diego)

JEL Classifications

D72: Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
F35: Foreign Aid
O17: Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
O19: International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations


American Economic Review


Quick Tools:

Sign up for Email Alerts

Follow us on Twitter

Subscription Information
(Institutional Administrator Access)

Explore:

AER - All Issues

AER - Forthcoming Articles

Virtual Field Journals


AEA Member Login:


AEAweb | AEA Journals | Contact Us