American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
(pp. 115–41)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
This paper provides new evidence on the interaction between patient information and physician financial incentives. Using rich microdata on childbirth, we compare the treatment of physicians when they are patients with that of comparable nonphysicians. We also exploit the presence of HMO-owned hospitals to determine how the treatment gap varies with providers' financial incentives. Consistent with induced demand, physicians are approximately 10 percent less likely to receive a C-section, with only a quarter of this effect attributable to differential sorting. While financial incentives affect the treatment of nonphysicians, physician-patients are largely unaffected. Physicians also have better health outcomes. (JEL D83, I11, J16, J44)Citation
Johnson, Erin M., and M. Marit Rehavi. 2016. "Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8 (1): 115–41. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20140160Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
- J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- J44 Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing