Saturday, Jan. 6, 2018 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM
Financial Fragility with SAM?
AbstractShared Appreciation Mortgages (SAMs) feature mortgage payments that adjust with house prices. Such mortgage contracts can stave off home owner default by providing payment relief in the wake of a large house price shock. SAMs have been hailed as an innovative solution that could prevent the next foreclosure crisis, act as a work-out tool during a crisis, and alleviate fiscal pressure during a downturn. They have inspired Fintech companies to other home equity contracts. However, the home owner's gains are the mortgage lender's losses. We consider a model with financial intermediaries who channel savings from saver households to borrower households. The financial sector has limited risk bearing capacity. SAMs pass through more aggregate house price risk and lead to financial fragility when the shock happens in periods of low intermediary capital. We compare house prices, mortgage rates, the size of the mortgage sector, default and refinancing rates, as well as borrower and saver consumption between an economy with standard mortgage contracts and an economy with SAMs.
Security Design, Informed Intermediation, and the Resolution of Borrowers' Financial Distress
AbstractBanks as informed intermediaries have information about their borrowers to make efficient liquidation versus restructuring decisions for distressed loans, but their information also creates an adverse selection problem when they seek financing from uninformed investors. We demonstrate that a bank with high-quality loans faces incentives to distort its resolution policy in order to improve allocative efficiency and to signal information about loan quality, with the direction of the distortion depending on whether the security issued to uninformed investors is concave or convex. We find that the bank's equilibrium resolution policy is biased towards liquidation when it optimally designs and sells a debt (concave) security to raise financing. Regulations aimed at promoting ex post efficient liquidation may increase banks' financing costs and discourage their screening effort, thereby reducing welfare.
- A1 - General Economics