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Hilton Atlanta, 215
American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association
Friday, Jan. 4, 2019 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM
- Chair: Scott Frame, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Not In My Neighbor's Back Yard? Laneway Homes and Neighbors' Property Values
Abstract"In Vancouver, as in many ""Superstar Cities,"" low density zoning in residential neighborhooods is both a sacred cow of amenity preservation and a scapegoat for unaffordability. In 2008, the City Council allowed homeowners to build small "laneway homes" behind the main residential structure on qualifying lots in all of the city's single family zones. We exploit this regulatory change to study the externalities that infill housing imposes on neighboring property values. Laneway homes are most commonly built when the main home is substantially rebuilt and generally reduce the size of rear garages. Neighbors who build laneway homes thus add little physical density but impose a household of renters on neighbors. Overall we find a small negative spillover that is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that the negative externalities of population density may be small. We do not need a stronger negative effect in more expensive neighborhoods or on fancier homes, but the negative spillover is statistically different from zero and larger in magnitude on properties with larger lots (-11.2%)."
Political Control of the State Legislature and Municipal Bond Financing for Affordable Housing
AbstractThis study investigates whether the tax-exempt municipal bonds have any effect on housing affordability at the state level. Specifically, we compare two different types of housing bonds: Multifamily Housing Bonds that support private affordable housing developers in the rental market and Mortgage Revenue Bonds that support low-income households who want to become a homeowner with a low-interest mortgage. In order to estimate the issuance volume of the housing bonds, we use the political control of the state legislature as an instrument, and find that Democratic or divided-controlled state legislature issues a larger volume of per-capita housing bonds, compared to the Republican-controlled legislature. We also find that, controlling for other affordable housing programs, a 10 percent increase in per-capita Multifamily Housing Bonds leads to a 0.7-0.8 percent decrease in the number of renter households facing housing cost burdens. However, Mortgage Revenue Bonds increase the number of owner-occupied households facing the cost burdens in the home-owner sector, contrary to the rental market analysis. The results imply that there is a shift of households from the rental market to the owner-occupied market with the financial support of low-interest mortgages, but those new homeowners still face housing cost burdens.
Waiting Lists, Lotteries and Public Housing: Natural Experiment Evidence from Amsterdam
AbstractPublic housing is allocated to households either through waiting time or through lotteries. We examine outcomes of both nonmarket allocation mechanisms for Amsterdam. Our identification strategy is based on information from a natural experiment where vacant public houses are allocated using lotteries to households who are also on waiting lists. We use the households waiting times to elicit information on the value of winning a lottery. Winning a lottery reduces waiting time by 6.5 years implying misallocation across households, which are less selective in accepting public housing offers. A welfare loss is also implied by demonstrating lottery-induced changes in the distribution of observed household characteristics allocated to public houses. Although a lottery seems to reduce welfare, it offers fundamental advantages to winners who value their gain at about 50,000.
Timothy James McQuade,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
- R1 - General Regional Economics
- R3 - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location