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Loews Philadelphia, Commonwealth Hall D
American Finance Association
Financial Regulation: Theory
Friday, Jan. 5, 2018 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM
- Chair: Marcus Opp, Stockholm School of Economics
The Incentive Channel of Capital Market Interventions
AbstractWe study how policy interventions designed to jump-start liquidity in frozen collateralized lending markets affect the private incentives to maintain or produce high-quality assets. Interventions may reinforce or destroy private incentives depending on whether expected future liquidity increases the relative value of owning a high-quality asset. When adverse selection stems primarily from uncertainty about returns on investment opportunities, intervention boosts private incentives and leads to faster recovery. In contrast, if adverse selection stems from the collateral value of assets, markets become subject to ``intervention traps'' -- expectations concerning future interventions eliminate private incentives to improve the quality of collateral, which stunts recovery and warrants continued market intervention. The adverse effects of interventions may therefore be particularly pronounced in settings where dispersed collateral values are at the root of market breakdowns to begin with.
Optimal Supervisory Architecture and Financial Integration in a Banking Union
AbstractBoth in the United States and in the Euro Area, bank supervision is the joint responsibility of local and central supervisors. I study a model in which local supervisors do not internalize as many externalities as a central supervisor. Local supervisors are more lenient, but banks also have weaker incentives to hide information from them. These two forces can make a joint supervisory architecture optimal, with more weight put on centralized supervision when cross-border externalities are larger. Conversely, more centralized supervision endogenously encourages banks to integrate more cross-border. Due to this complementarity, the economy can be trapped in an equilibrium with both too little central supervision and too little financial integration, when a superior equilibrium would be achievable.
The Redistributive Effects of Bank Capital Regulation
AbstractWe build a general equilibrium model of banks’ optimal capital structure, where investors are reluctant to invest in financial products other than deposits, and where bankruptcy is costly. We first show that banks raise both deposits and equity, and that investors are willing to provide equity only if adequately compensated. We then introduce (binding) capital requirements and show that: (i) it distorts investment away from productive projects toward storage; or (ii) it increases the cost of raising capital for banks, with the bulk of this cost accruing to depositors. These results hold also when we extend the model to incorporate various rationales justifying capital regulation.
University of Chicago
University of Texas-Austin and University Carlos III of Madrid
London School of Economics
University Carlos III
- G2 - Financial Institutions and Services