The AEA is providing open access to all journal content on the AEA website through August 2020 to overcome any difficulties some may have accessing library subscriptions during these challenging times.
The AEA is providing open access to all journal content on the AEA website through August 2020 to overcome any difficulties some may have accessing library subscriptions during these challenging times.
How do governors' reelection motives affect policy experimentation? We develop a theoretical model of this situation, and then
test the predictions in data on U.S. state-level welfare reforms from
1978 to 2007. This period marked the most dramatic shift in social
policy since the New Deal. Our findings indicate that governors
with strong electoral support are less likely to experiment than governors with little support. Yet, governors who cannot be reelected
actually experiment more than governors striving for reelection.
These ndings are robust to controlling for ideology, preferences
for redistribution, the state legislature, and cross-state learning.
