American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Strategic Tournaments
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 5,
no. 4, November 2013
(pp. 31–54)
Abstract
A strategic (round-robin) tournament is a simultaneous n-player game built on top of a symmetric two-player game G. Each player chooses one action in G and is matched to play G against all other players. The winner of the tournament is the player who achieves the highest total G-payoff. The tournament has several interpretations as an evolutionary model, as a model of social interaction, and as a model of competition between firms with procedurally rational consumers. We prove some general properties of the model and explore the intuition that a tournament encourages riskier behaviorCitation
Arad, Ayala, and Ariel Rubinstein. 2013. "Strategic Tournaments." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5 (4): 31–54. DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.4.31Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games