This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. AEA Papers and Proceedings
  4. Search Results
  5. Research Design with Weighted Lotteries in School Choice

AEA Papers and Proceedings

ISSN 2574-0768 (Print) | ISSN 2574-0776 (Online)

Menu

Research Design with Weighted Lotteries in School Choice

  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu
  • Inkoo Back
AEA Papers and Proceedings
vol. 114, May 2024
(pp. 502–06)
Download Full Text PDF

Abstract

Centralized admissions are an integral part of parental school choice programs. Most districts use a version of the deferred acceptance algorithm to assign applicants to schools. Centralized admissions produce data with quasi-experimental variation in student assignment that is integral in program evaluation. Recent developments in research design consider the basic version of the deferred acceptance algorithm. However, most districts adapt advanced versions of the deferred acceptance algorithm to implement their diversity policy in admissions, such as favoring applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds in lottery tie-breaking. We develop research design for data from the deferred acceptance algorithm with weighted lotteries.

Citation

Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, and Inkoo Back. 2024. "Research Design with Weighted Lotteries in School Choice." AEA Papers and Proceedings, 114: 502–06. DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20241135

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
  • I21 Analysis of Education
  • I28 Education: Government Policy