AEA Papers and Proceedings
ISSN 2574-0768 (Print) | ISSN 2574-0776 (Online)
Auditability in School Choice
AEA Papers and Proceedings
vol. 114,
May 2024
(pp. 492–96)
Abstract
In centralized public school admissions, participants may not fully observe other participants' preference rankings and priorities. In this paper, we evaluate prominent assignment rules in terms of their auditability properties. We show that Serial Dictatorship and Immediate Acceptance rules are maximally auditable, in a sense that any deviation from running them as promised can be detected with only two applicants' private information. The Deferred Acceptance and Top Trading Cycles rules are minimally auditable, in a sense that some deviations will not be detected unless one has close to full information about the preference rankings and priorities.Citation
Grigoryan, Aram, and Markus Möller. 2024. "Auditability in School Choice." AEA Papers and Proceedings, 114: 492–96. DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20241064Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
- I21 Analysis of Education
- I28 Education: Government Policy