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The Journal of Economic Perspectives is publicly accessible at no charge, compliments of the American Economic Association. The journal is also available for download in e-reader formats.
Abstracts are included below the table of contents. |
Table of Contents
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Symposium: Industrial Policy
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Symposium: Behavioral Incentive Compatibility
Articles
Features
Abstracts of Articles
| 1. |
Export-Led Industrial Policy for Developing Countries: Is There a Way to Pick Winners? |
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Tristan Reed |
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Industrial policy prioritizes growth in specific sectors. Yet there is little agreement about how to target sectors in practice, and many argue that governments cannot pick winners. This essay observes that governments can and do identify tradable sectors where public inputs accelerate growth and generate economic benefits. These strategic sectors are: (1) those that are relatively more productive, and (2) those that are relatively less productive but require technology like the country's existing technology and have rapidly growing markets and limited international competition. Since developing countries are productive in fewer sectors and have less technology, targeting can be more valuable for them. Export promotion agencies are institutions that have demonstrated effectiveness in coordinating public inputs to grow these sectors. Compared to protectionism, this alternative approach to 'industrial policy' is cheaper, less susceptible to capture by unproductive firms, and permissible under the rules of international trade agreements. Many countries' development strategies adopt this approach. |
| 2. |
The Political Economy of Industrial Policy |
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Réka Juhász and Nathan Lane |
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We examine the ways in which political realities shape industrial policy through the lens of modern political economy. We consider two broad "governance constraints": (1) the political forces that shape how industrial policy is chosen and (2) the ways in which state capacity affects implementation. The framework of modern political economy suggests that government failure is not a necessary feature of industrial policy; rather, it is more likely to fail when countries pursue industrial policies beyond their governance capacity constraints. As such, our political economy of industrial policy is not fatalist. Instead, it enables policymakers to constructively confront challenges. |
| 3. |
Industrial Policy: Lessons from Shipbuilding |
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Panle Jia Barwick, Myrto Kalouptsidi, and Nahim Bin Zahur |
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Industrial policy has been used throughout history in some form or other by most countries. Yet, it remains one of the most contentious issues among policy makers and economists alike. In part, this is because the empirical evidence on whether and how it should be implemented remains slim. Scant data on government subsidies, conflicting theoretical arguments, and the need to account for governments' short and long-run objectives, render research particularly challenging. In this article, we outline a theory-based empirical methodology that relies on estimating an industry equilibrium model to measure hidden subsidies, assess their welfare consequences for the domestic and global economy, as well as evaluate the effectiveness of different policy designs. We illustrate this approach using the global shipbuilding industry as a prototypical example of an industry targeted by industrial policy, especially in periods of heavy industrialization. Just in the past century, Europe, followed by Japan, then South Korea, and more recently China, developed national shipbuilding programs to propel their firms to global leaders. Success has been mixed across programs, certainly by welfare metrics, and sometimes even by growth metrics. We use our methodology on China to dissect the impact of such programs, what made them more or less successful, and how we can justify why governments have chosen shipbuilding as a target. |
| 4. |
Semiconductors and Modern Industrial Policy |
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Chad P. Bown and Dan Wang |
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Semiconductors have emerged as a headline in the resurgence of modern industrial policy. This paper explores the political economic history of the sector, the changing nature of the semiconductor supply chain, and the new sources of concern that have motivated the most recent turn to government intervention. It also explores details of that turn to industrial policy by the United States, China, Japan, Europe, South Korea, and Taiwan. Modern industrial policy for semiconductors has included not only subsidies for manufacturing, but also new import tariffs, export controls, foreign investment screening, and antitrust actions. |
| 5. |
Alexander Hamilton's Report on Manufactures and Industrial Policy |
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Richard Sylla |
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Hamilton's 1791 state paper on manufactures is a forward-looking argument for US industrialization supported by public policies designed to encourage it. Conventional wisdom circa 1790, along with static considerations of comparative advantage indicated that the United States should stick to farming, export its agricultural surpluses, and import European manufactures. Mercantilist trade policies of the major European empires, however, were barriers to US exports. Hamilton therefore contended that US manufacturing using the latest machine technologies would alleviate the effects of European trade restrictions by creating domestic demand for agricultural surpluses. His report specifies industries worthy of support, and policy measures to encourage their development. During the century that followed, US governments adopted nearly all of Hamilton's recommendations. These measures contributed to an average annual rate of growth of industrial output of 5 percent during that century, helping the United States to become the world's leading manufacturing nation. |
| 6. |
Evaluating Behavioral Incentive Compatibility: Insights from Experiments |
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David Danz, Lise Vesterlund, and Alistair J. Wilson |
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Incentive compatibility is core to mechanism design. The success of auctions, matching algorithms, and voting systems all hinge on the ability to select incentives that make it in the individual's interest to reveal their type. But how do we test whether a mechanism that is designed to be incentive compatible is actually so in practice, particularly when faced with boundedly rational agents with nonstandard preferences? We review the many experimental tests that have been designed to assess behavioral incentive compatibility, separating them into two categories: indirect tests that evaluate behavior within the mechanism, and direct tests that assess how participants respond to the mechanism's incentives. Using belief elicitation as a running example, we show that the most popular elicitations are not behaviorally incentive compatible. In fact, the incentives used under these elicitations discourage rather than encourage truthful revelation. |
| 7. |
Behavioral Incentive Compatibility and Empirically Informed Welfare Analysis: An Introductory Guide |
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Alex Rees-Jones |
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A growing body of research conducts welfare analysis that assumes behavioral incentive compatibility—that is, that behavior is governed by pursuit of incentives conditional on modeled imperfections in decision-making. In this article, I present several successful examples of studies that apply this approach and I use them to illustrate guidance for pursuing this type of analysis. |
| 8. |
Designing Simple Mechanisms |
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Shengwu Li |
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It matters whether real-world mechanisms are simple. If participants cannot see that a mechanism is incentive-compatible, they may refuse to participate or may behave in ways that undermine the mechanism. There are several ways to formalize what it means for a mechanism to be "simple." This essay explains three of them, and suggests directions for future research. |
| 9. |
The Problem of Good Conduct among Financial Advisers |
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Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos, and Amit Seru |
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Households in the United States often rely on financial advisers for investment and savings decisions, yet there is a widespread perception that many advisers are dishonest. This distrust is not unwarranted: approximately one in fifteen advisers has a history of serious misconduct, with this rate rising to one in six in certain regions and firms. We explore the economic foundations of the financial advisory industry and demonstrate how heterogeneity in household financial sophistication and conflicts of interest allow poor financial advice to persist. Using data on the universe of financial advisers and the Survey of Consumer Finances, we document who uses financial advisers and the prevalence of misconduct in the industry. Our findings suggest that a lack of financial sophistication is a key friction, making enhanced disclosure a potentially effective policy response. Supporting this, we show through a difference-in-differences approach that "naming and shaming" firms with high misconduct rates was associated with a 10 percent reduction in misconduct. |
| 10. |
Retrospectives: Friedman and Schwartz, Disaggregated |
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Jennifer Burns |
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What was the contribution of Anna Schwartz to the landmark book she co-authored with Milton Friedman, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960? A close examination of archival evidence suggests three primary contributions Schwartz made to the work, and to Friedman's career more generally. The first was meeting the classic challenge of quantitative economic history: going into the field to locate and collect archival data that had been assembled for purposes unrelated to economic research, and deciding how best to use that data. Second, Schwartz had a decades-long role as technical sounding board and shaper of the statistical approach taken in the book. Schwartz's third and arguably greatest contribution was to transform A Monetary History of the United States into a compelling narrative argument that made an impact far beyond the economics profession. Together, these findings show Schwartz to be a scholar who made significant and lasting contributions to monetary economics, economic history, and the broader field of economics. |
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