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Gender and the Firm

Paper Session

Saturday, Jan. 6, 2024 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (CST)

Convention Center, 301B
Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chair: Ralph De Haas, EBRD, KU Leuven and CEPR

Are Women More Exposed to Firm Shocks?

Ramin P. Baghai
,
Stockholm School of Economics, CEPR and ECGI
Rui C. Silva
,
Nova School of Business and Economics and CEPR
Margarida Soares
,
Nova School of Business and Economics

Abstract

Workers care deeply about wage and employment stability. Given potentially differing attitudes towards risk, we investigate whether the provision of wage and employment insurance by firms differs for men and women. We find that women are less protected than men against idiosyncratic shocks to their employers—a gender gap in firm insurance. Using detailed administrative data from Sweden, we document that the elasticity of women’s wages with respect to variations in firm’s idiosyncratic performance is 90 percent higher than that of men. Moreover, the likelihood of dismissal due to a negative firm shock is 36 percent higher for female than for male employees. These gender differences in exposure to corporate idiosyncratic shocks are larger for employees with children, in firms with fewer female executives, and in financially constrained firms.

Blended Finance and Female Entrepreneurship

Cagatay Bircan
,
EBRD and University College London
Ralph De Haas
,
EBRD, KU Leuven, and CEPR
Halil Aydin
,
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey

Abstract

We combine micro data from a credit registry with firm-level administrative tax records to trace the impacts of a large-scale blended finance program for female entrepreneurs in Turkey. Using a synthetic difference-in-differences approach, we first document that participating banks durably increase lending to women—both in absolute terms and relative to male entrepreneurs. Banks lend more to pre-existing female borrowers, poach clients from other banks, and crowd in first-time borrowers. Tracing new borrowers in the credit registry reveals that the program allowed banks to durably crowd-in a new segment of first-time borrowers without increasing credit risk. We then investigate and quantify the real-economic impacts of the blended finance program. To do so, we first extract firm-specific lending shocks to female entrepreneurs by exploiting variation in bank lending at the national level and pre-existing bank-firm relationships. We confirm that these program-driven credit supply shocks translate into increased borrowing by female entrepreneurs across the board. Yet, only repeat borrowers with an initially high (relative to other firms in the same two-digit industry and in the same district) average revenue product of capital, or with fewer tangible assets, translate this increased borrowing into a significant expansion of capital and sales. Lastly, we use a shift-share style research design to isolate district-level lending shocks to female entrepreneurs. This allows us to estimate the program’s potential real-economic impact on poached clients and first-time borrowers. We show that the overall macro impact at the district level is modest.

The Gender of Firm Decision-Makers and Within-Firm Wage Disparity

Manthos Delis
,
Audencia Business School
Iftekhar Hasan
,
Fordham University, Bank of Finland and University of Sydney
Maria Iosifidi
,
Montpellier Business School
Panagiotis N. Politsidis
,
Audencia Business School
Anthony Saunders
,
New York University

Abstract

We theoretically establish and empirically examine the hypothesis that an important factor controlling within-firm wage disparity is the increase in the number and share of female firm decision makers. We draw empirical inferences from two separate samples. The first is a sample of 15,000 small European firms, for which we have confidential information on owner’s gender and within-firm wage disparity (owner’s income to average employee income). Based on observing changes in ownership from a female to a male owner, our baseline results show a 2.5 percent increase in within-firm wage disparity due to a gender change in firm ownership. We uncover similar results when using data for large U.S. public firms and focus on gender diversity in the boardroom. Empirical identification in this sample exploits as an instrumental variable the proportion of male directors on the board who sit on other boards on which there are female directors. In terms of mechanisms, we find that the easing effect of gender diversity is almost entirely reversed for innovative firms, as these firms are more likely to invest in skilled labor, thereby reducing within-firm wage disparity. Such a reversal is also evident for firms operating in sectors with a strong female-employee presence (and consequently female directors).

Winds of Change: Gender Quota on Boards in the Face of Patriarchy

Lakshmi Naaraayanan
,
London Business School
Kasper Meisner Nielsen
,
Copenhagen Business School and Danish Finance Institute

Abstract

We study the introduction of gender quotas in India, the first country with strong patriarchal views to mandate female directors on corporate boards. Despite small penalties, we find high compliance rates, resulting in a threefold expansion of the female director labor pool. After the reform, almost half of the firms appoint and retain female directors beyond the ambit of the quota, a change that is significantly weaker on boards with stronger patriarchal views. The better opportunities for females manifest in a higher likelihood of appointment on important subcommittees and in a reduction in the gender gap in director remuneration from 30 to 3 percent. Our results suggest that although gender quotas deepen and diversify the director pool, strong patriarchal views among incumbent directors hinder the transition to gender-diverse boards.

Discussant(s)
Kasper Meisner Nielsen
,
Copenhagen Business School and Danish Finance Institute
Margarida Soares
,
Nova School of Business and Economics
Francesca Truffa
,
Stanford University
Elena Simintzi
,
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
JEL Classifications
  • L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
  • G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance