Labor Demand Response to Labor Supply Incentives: Evidence from the German Mini-Job Reform
Abstract
This paper analyzes how firms respond to changes in tax benefits for low-earning workers and how, through equilibrium effects, such policies also affect non-targeted, high-earning workers. I explore firm-level outcomes around the Mini-Job Reform in Germany in 2003, which entailed a significant expansion of tax benefits for low-earning workers. Firm responses are decomposed in terms of scale effects arising from lower labor costs and substitution effects due to changes in relative prices of low-earning and high-earning labor. Using a differences-in-differences approach I document that establishments with a high intensity of low-earning workers prior to the reform expand relative to low-intensity establishments. This relative expansion is biased towards the type of workers not targeted by the tax benefits. In addition, establishments initially less intensive in low-earning workers substitute employment towards low-earning workers without expanding at the same pace. My findings are consistent with a model of the labor market which features tax sharing between workers and firms and simultaneous shifts in labor supply and demand after changes in tax benefits for low-earning workers. In this setting, there is a reallocation of employment and production from firms initially less intensive in low-earning workers to firms with a high pre-reform intensity. These equilibrium effects across different types of workers and firms are relevant for the design of labor market policies targeting low-earning workers.