Ethnic Polarization, Displaced People, Governance, and War
Sunday, Jan. 5, 2020 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (PDT)
- Chair: Solomon Polachek, State University of New York-Binghamton
A Spatial Model of Internal Displacement and Forced Migration
AbstractThis paper develops a spatial model of internal and external forced migration. We propose a model reminiscent of Hoteling’s spatial model in economics and Schelling’s model of segregation. Conflict is modeled as a shock that hits a country at certain location and generates displacement of people located near the shock’s location. Some displaced people cross a border, thus becoming refugees, while others remain as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The model delivers predictions about how the fractions of a country’s population that become refugees and IDPs ought to be related with the intensity of the shock, country size, terrain ruggedness and the degree of geographical proximity of the country with respect to the rest of the world. The predictions of the model are then tested against real data using a panel data set of 200 countries expanding over the 1960-2016 period. The empirical evidence is broadly in line with the predictions of the model.
Self-Enforcing Peace Agreements that Preserve the Status Quo
AbstractOn the basis of a single-period, guns-versus-butter, complete-information model in which two agents dispute control over an insecure portion of their combined output, we study the choice between a peace agreement that maintains the status quo without arming (or unarmed peace) and open conflict (or war) that is possibly destructive. With a focus on outcomes that are immune to both unilateral deviations and coalitional deviations, we find that, depending on war's destructive effects, the degree of output security and the initial distribution of resources, peace can, but need not, emerge in equilibrium. We also find that, while ex ante resource transfers without commitment can improve the prospects for peace, war remains the unique equilibrium in pure strategies when the initial distribution of resources is sufficiently uneven.
External Intervention, Identity, and Civil War
AbstractWe examine how external intervention interacts with ethnic polarization to induce rebellion and civil war. Previous literature views polarization as internally produced | the result of demographic characteristics or inter-group differences made salient by ethnic entrepreneurs. We complement these approaches by showing that polarization is also affected by international politics. We demonstrate that polarization is correlated with civil war when the potential for actual or anticipated intervention is high. We provide a model in which external intervention is the catalyst for civil war in combination with ethnic or social identification. In our model, local actors representing different groups are emboldened by foreign patrons to pursue their objectives violently. This, in turn, makes ethnic identity salient and induces inter-group polarization. Without the specter of intervention, polarization is often insuffcient to induce war and, in turn, in the absence of polarization intervention is insuffcient to induce war. We illustrate the model with case evidence from Ukraine.
- F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy