Friday, Jan. 3, 2020 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM (PDT)
- Chair: Ying Fang, Xiamen University
Supporting Private Provision of Ecosystem Services Through Contracts in Environmental Markets: Evidence from Lab and Pilot Field Experiments
AbstractThe free riding incentive that exists in public good provision has been a major obstacle to establishing markets or payment incentives for environmental public goods, such as ecosystem services. The use of monetary incentives to induce private provision of public goods has gained increasing support, including from the USDA Office of Environmental Markets, to help to market ecosystem services provided by alternative farmland management practices. Using a series of lab experiments and a pilot field experiment, we explore new ways to raise money from individuals to pay farmers for alternative management practices. In our proposed mechanisms, individuals receive an assurance contract that offers qualified contributors an assurance payment as compensation in the event that total contributions fail to achieve the threshold needed to fund the public good. Contributors qualify by contracting to support provision with a minimum contribution. Our public good involves delaying the harvest of a ten-acre hayfield to allow grassland birds to nest successfully. Evidence from lab experiments shows that the provision probability, consumer surplus, and social welfare significantly increase when the assurance contract is present. Consistent with the theory and the lab experiment, we show that the individual contribution is determined by the value range and the assurance payment level in the pilot field experiment. Our proximate motivation is to support wildlife habitats provided by farmland, but our approach contributes to the private provision of ecosystem services and other types of environmental public goods.
Voice of the Masses and Responsive Authoritarianism in China: Online Environmental Complain and Government Response
AbstractVoice of the Masses by online complaints, especially social media-based online complaints, have gradually become an important form of social supervision and a new way for the public to participate in environmental governance. This study examines local government responses to the online environmental complaints on Sina Weibo in China and explores whether public online complaints can attract local government attention and response under the Chinese environmental Authoritarianism. Through the government response analysis of the 2014-2016 online complaints, the study found that the environmental complains that public is more concerned about (forwarding), higher-level government concerns, and online complaints of listed companies that local governments are more likely to respond. Also, the higher the bargaining power of the companies being complained (the larger the scale), the lower the possibility of local government response.
The Effectiveness of Consumption Tax on the Reduction of Car Pollution in China
AbstractExposure to airborne pollution has substantial adverse health consequences (Cohen
et al, 2004). Governments around the world have paid attention to this problem and
started to take actions to mitigate its harmful effects. In this paper, we investigate how
a change in the consumption tax structure affects car emissions by exploiting exogenous
variation from a natural experiment that took place in China. Our results show that
this tax policy, which doubled the imposition paid on cars with large engines, reduced
the emissions of all the pollutants studied, with the most signicant decrease of 11%
noted in Particulate Matter and Carbon Monoxide.
- Q5 - Environmental Economics
- Q0 - General