Short-Time Work Arrangements: Recent Developments and Policy Implications
Saturday, Jan. 4, 2020 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (PDT)
- Chair: Etienne Lalé, University of Quebec-Montreal
Involuntary Part-Time Work and the Gig Economy: Boon or Bane?
AbstractIn recent decades, both involuntary part-time employment and informal employment in the on-demand or "gig" economy have grown. Prior research suggests that these trends may be related, with gig work acting as a source of supplemental income for individuals employed part-time but wanting more hours. I will use CPS and other microdata to assess the systematic relationships between these trends, focusing on the extent to which the growing availability of gig jobs reflects added flexibility for hours-constrained workers (a "boon") or a source of additional income instability for struggling workers "bane").
Part Time Pay Penalties are Persisting
AbstractDo part time workers experience an hourly earnings rate disadvantage? If so, how does that vary by type of worker, sector, hours and reason for part time working? We use all CPS MORG data pooled from 2003-2018-picking up where left off by Hirsch (2005). We compute a raw pay penalty for "usually working part time" hours, with state and year fixed effects; then, an adjusted pay penalty, controlling for the range of workers' demographic and work characteristics, and finally, a fixed effects model. We compare the pay penalty size by gender and race, by number of weekly hours, union status and reason for working less than full time-voluntary or involuntarily reasons (slack work and business conditions or could only find part time). We interpret the latter results in light of compensating wage differential theory. We find wide disparities in the adjusted pay penalty by type of industry-all but one exception sector have negative pay penalties, ranging from 6% to almost 50%. We find there are smooth size gradations inversely related to both weekly hours and to voluntariness. Finally, we estimate fixed effects models, using the panel feature of the CPS-and worker changes between part time and full time status-to get a pure wage penalty estimate. This reduces the penalty sizes to being almost as small as was found by Hirsch (2005), suggesting a marked role played by some kind of heterogeneity between full and part time workers. A unique approach here separates out hourly paid from salaried workers-this shows larger pay penalties the hourly paid, while salaried part time workers actually receive pay premia. Policy implications are inferred regarding regulations of part time jobs, following the pay parity policies in other advanced countries, ILO standards, and recent access to house ordinances.
Reconciling Survey and Administrative Measures of Self-Employment
AbstractThis paper addresses key questions about self-employment: whether and how much such work has grown over the past several decades, the characteristics of self-employment work and workers, and how self-employment interacts with wage and salary employment. Existing household survey data do a poor job of capturing self-employment, whereas administrative data typically contain limited information about the people who are doing it. We combine records from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey (CPS) with earnings information contained in the Social Security Administration’s Detailed Earnings Record (DER) files. The information in the DER on self-employment earnings comes from Schedule SE filings; the DER also includes Form W-2 information on wage and salary earnings. This linked data file covers the 1996-2015 period.
Analysis of the linked CPS-ASEC and DER records has produced several key findings:
• Over the 1996-2015 period, two-thirds of those with self-employment earnings in the DER had no self-employment earnings in the CPS-ASEC.
• Between 1996 and 2015, the number of people with self-employment earnings in the DER but not the CPS-ASEC grew by 6.2 million; the number with CPS-ASEC self-employment earnings who did not have DER self-employment earnings changed relatively little and the gap between the two self-employment series grew by 5.5 million.
This paper investigates alternative explanations for the growing number of DER self-employed with no CPS-ASEC self-employment earnings. Possible contributing factors include changes in workforce characteristics (e.g. growth in the number of older self-employed persons), changes in the persistence of self-employment, and changes in reporting behavior.
- J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor