Topics in Economic Theory II
Friday, Jan. 4, 2019 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM
- Chair: Joyee Deb, Yale University
Information and Communication in Organizations
AbstractWe study a constrained information design problem in an organization.
Since the allocations of information and decision-rights are separated, information is transmitted strategically within the organization. The optimal information structure eliminates conflicts and
serves as a substitute to the allocation of authority in the organization.
Optimal Information Design for Search Goods
AbstractWe consider the problem of a consumer with an uncertain valuation of a search good, who receives a noisy signal of value before deciding to search. We characterize the consumer-optimal and seller-worst signals for the monopoly pricing problem in this environment. We have two main insights. First, both the consumer-optimal and seller-worst signals use a conditional distribution given the high value that generates a unit-elastic demand. Second, the consumer-optimal and seller-worst signals coincide if search costs are sufficiently low, but differ for large search costs.
- D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance