Models of Politics
Saturday, Jan. 5, 2019 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM
- Chair: Konstantin Sonin, University of Chicago
Multi-Candidate Political Competition and the Industrial Organization of Politics
AbstractIn this paper, we present and micro-found a theory of multi-candidate political competitions that allows to study various issues related to the industrial organization of politics. The flexibility of our analytical framework is demonstrated through several applications on the topics of special interest politics, coalition formation in the legislature in proportional elections, redistribution under alternative electoral rules and franchise extension.
Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup
AbstractMedia freedom is a problem for any dictator as it resolves collective action problem in protests. However, a dictator might allow media freedom if there is a threat of a palace coup, the most frequent end of an autocratic leader tenure. We use a global game approach to analyze a situation, in which the incumbent leader trades off the possibility of protest against him and the possibility of protests aimed to restore his power if he is dismissed in a coup. Thus, media freedom serves as an ex ante protection for such a dictator, and the higher is the probability of a coup, the more media freedom the dictator would tolerate.
Why the Political World Is Flat: An Endogenous "Left" and "Right" in Multidimensional Elections
AbstractThis paper analyzes a multidimensional model of candidate positioning in common interest elections. In an essentially unique equilibrium, polarized candidates bundle issue positions that are logically related, effectively reducing the election to a single summary dimension. The model gives structure to prominent philosophical perspectives, and explains otherwise puzzling empirical features of elections such as why even loosely connected policies are bundled so consistently.
- H0 - General
- D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty