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Atlanta Marriott Marquis, L507
Information Aggregation in Markets, Elections and the Media
Friday, Jan. 4, 2019 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM
- Chair: Timothy Feddersen, Northwestern University
Information Aggregation in Competitive Markets
AbstractWe study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in a market with a large population of privately informed buyers and sellers. Our main result identifies a property of information—the betweenness property—that is both necessary and sufficient for aggregation. The characterization provides predictions about equilibrium prices in complex, multidimensional environments.
Robust Voter Persuasion
AbstractThis paper studies persuasion of large electorates in a general environment with heterogeneous, private preferences. Persuasion is possible in a simple equilibrium under a weak condition on voter preferences. Persuasion is even possible just by releasing additional information when voters already have private signals and a version of the Condorcet Jury Theorem would otherwise hold in a large election. Persuasion does not require detailed knowledge of the distribution of voters' preferences and one signal structure can be used uniformly across environments.
Media Competition and Social Disagreement
AbstractAbstract: We study the competitive provision and endogenous acquisition of political information. Our main result identifies a natural equilibrium channel through which a more competitive market for information increases social disagreement. A critical insight we put forward is that competition among information providers leads to a particular kind of informational specialization: firms provide relatively less information on issues that are of common interest, and relatively more information on issues along which agents' preferences are more heterogeneous. This enables agents to find information providers that are better aligned with their preferences. While agents become individually better informed, the social value of the information provided in equilibirum decreases, thereby decreasing the probability that the society implements socially optimal policies.
Simon Fraser University
University of Chicago
- C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making