Gender Differences and Economic Outcomes
Friday, Jan. 4, 2019 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM
- Chair: Eva Ranehill, University of Gothenburg
Knowing When to Ask: The Cost of Leaning In
AbstractWomen’s reluctance to negotiate is often used to explain the gender wage gap, popularizing the push for women to “lean-in” and negotiate more. Examining an environment where women achieve positive profits when they choose to negotiate, we find that increased negotiations are not helpful. Women know when to ask: they enter negotiations resulting in positive profits and avoid negotiations resulting in negative profits. While the findings are similar for men, we find no evidence that men are more adept than women at knowing when to ask. Thus, our results do not justify a greater push for women to negotiate.
The Gender Leadership Gap: Does Aversion to Negative Judgment Matter?
AbstractUpper-level managerial positions involve the necessity of making controversial employment choices that may lead to backlash from employees. Do gender differences in aversion to negative judgment contribute to the gender leadership gap? We address this question through a novel laboratory experiment that simulates corporate decision-making. We find that: 1) women are significantly less likely to self-select into a managerial position when facing the possibility of receiving negative messages from employees, 2) there are no gender differences in manager performance, 3) male and female managers have different leadership styles, and 4) female managers receive significantly more angry messages from male workers.
Are Women Less Effective Leaders than Men? Evidence from Experiments Using Coordination Games
AbstractDespite advances in many domains, women remain underrepresented in leadership. We study whether differential effectiveness of male and female leaders provides a basis for this gap. We confirm, using an implicit association test, that leadership is more strongly associated with men than women. We compare the effectiveness of male and female leaders for obtaining requested equilibria in coordination games, where beliefs about leaders’ effectiveness can be self-confirming. Our experiments use different types of coordination games and vary whether followers observe leaders’ gender. We find that differential effectiveness of male and female leaders depends on aspects of the underlying coordination game.
- J1 - Demographic Economics