Vacancies and Recruitment
Saturday, Jan. 5, 2019 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM
- Chair: Steven J. Davis, University of Chicago
Minimum Wage Increases and Vacancies
AbstractWe estimate the impact of minimum wage increases on the quantity of labor demanded as measured by firms' vacancy postings. This is in contrast to the existing and highly contentious literature that studies the effect of the minimum wage on employment, which is an equilibrium outcome shaped by a combination of changes in the firms' hiring and firing, quantity of labor demanded and labor supplied, and other factors. We use confidential, county-level vacancy data from the Conference Board's Help Wanted Online Data Series that cover the period from 2004 to 2017. The vacancy counts are available at the 6-digit occupation level, reported separately for total vacancies and new vacancies, allowing us to distinguish between stocks and flows of vacancies. We separately study state-level increases in the minimum wages, as well as minimum wage increases at the sub-state jurisdiction levels. We find that minimum wage increases lead to substantial declines in new vacancy postings. Estimating the impact of minimum wage hikes on vacancy creation for different job categories is under way.
Incentives Can Reduce Bias in Online Reviews
AbstractOnline reviews are a powerful means of propagating the reputations of products, services, and even employers. However, existing research suggests that online reviews often suffer from selection bias; people with extreme opinions are more motivated to share them than people with moderate opinions, resulting in biased distributions of reviews. Providing incentives for reviewing has the potential to reduce this selection bias, because incentives can mitigate the motivational deficit of people who hold moderate opinions. Using data from one of the leading employer review companies Glassdoor, we show that voluntary reviews have a different distribution from incentivized reviews. The likely bias in the distribution of voluntary reviews can affect workers' choice of employers, because it changes the ranking of industries by average employee satisfaction. Because observational data from Glassdoor are not able to provide a measure of the true distribution of employer reviews, we complement our investigation with a randomized controlled experiment on MTurk. We find that when participants' decision to review their employer is voluntary, the resulting distribution of reviews differs from the distribution of forced reviews. Moreover, providing relatively high monetary rewards or a pro-social cue as incentives for reviewing reduces this bias. We conclude that while voluntary employer reviews often suffer from selection bias, incentives can significantly reduce bias and help workers make more informed employer choices.
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
New York University
- J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor