Economics of Taxis and Uber
Sunday, Jan. 7, 2018 1:00 PM - 3:00 PM
- Chair: Henry Farber, Princeton University
New York City Taxis in an Uber World
AbstractWe empirically examine the effect of Uber presence on (medallion) taxi trip demand in NYC. We estimate Uber elasticities of demand for the Yellow cab and Green cab using NYC medallion taxi trip records and Uber pick up records from April to September 2014, and January to June 2015. The elasticities are estimated along with instrumental variable estimations of a taxi trip demand model. We find an empirical evidence that, in overall, Uber is a complement, rather than a substitute, for both Yellow cab and Green cab passengers. For Yellow cab. the positive and significant elasticity is estimated only in Manhattan below 110th street, where 91% of daily Yellow cab trip and 72% of daily Uber trip were occurred. In addition, we find different elasticity estimate in different time and day at different area. Negative Uber elasticity of Yellow cab estimate in Manhattan below 110th street during the morning rush hour implies that; Uber turn out to be a substitute during the morning rush hour in the central business district of Manhattan.
Pay for Performance or Performance for Pay? The Case of Food Delivery Drivers
AbstractWhile many managers assume that pay-for-performance incentive schemes align employees’ incentives with their own, they may also discourage employees’ socially based motivations to perform at high levels. I test this hypothesis by conducting a multi-year field experiment to assess how tipping affects food delivery drivers’ performance. Standard economic theory suggests that only the promise of future rewards motivates workers, and therefore tipping drivers at the time of ordering should decrease their motivation to deliver food quickly. On the other hand, tipping at the time of ordering may increase drivers’ motivation through activating feelings of goodwill and reciprocity. I find that tipping at the time of ordering leads to significantly slower delivery times than withholding the tip until the time of delivery. However, I also find evidence for the reciprocity hypothesis insofar as larger up-front tips lead to significantly faster delivery times than smaller up-front tips.
The Supply Side of Discrimination: Evidence From the Labor Supply of Boston Taxi Drivers
AbstractThis paper investigates supply-side discrimination in the labor market for Boston taxi drivers. Using data on millions of trips from 2010-2015, I explore whether the labor supply behavior of taxi drivers differs by the gender, racial/ethnic, or age composition of Boston neighborhoods. I find that disparities in shift hours due to neighborhood demographics exist even when differences in local earnings opportunities are taken into account. I observe heterogeneity in the amount that drivers discriminate and find this discrimination is primarily statistical rather than taste-based. As drivers gain experience and learn to better anticipate wage variation in different areas, discrimination decreases.
- R4 - Transportation Economics