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Information Transmission and Trading: Empirical

Paper Session

Saturday, Jan. 6, 2018 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM

Loews Philadelphia, Commonwealth Hall C
Hosted By: American Finance Association
  • Chair: Vyacheslav Fos, Boston College

IQ From IP: Simplifying Search in Portfolio Choice

Huaizhi Chen
,
Harvard Business School
Lauren Cohen
,
Harvard Business School
Umit Gurun
,
University of Texas-Dallas
Dong Lou
,
London School of Economics
Christopher Malloy
,
Harvard Business School

Abstract

Using a novel database that tracks web traffic on the SEC’s EDGAR servers between 2003 and 2016, we show that mutual funds exert effort to reduce the dimensionality of their portfolio selection problem. Specifically, we show that mutual fund managers’ gather information on a very particular subset of firms and insiders, and their surveillance stays largely unchanged over time. This tracking has powerful implications for their portfolio choice, and its information content. An institution that downloaded an insider-trading filling by a given firm last quarter increases its likelihood of downloading an insider-trading filing on the same firm by more than 41.3 % this quarter, which is 8 times larger than the unconditional probability of an institution downloading at least one insider trading filing in a quarter from any firm in her existing portfolio (4.8%). Moreover, the average tracked stock that an institution sells generates 7.5% annualized DGTW-adjusted alpha, whereas the sale of an average non-tracked stock has close to zero DGTW adjusted alpha. The outperformance of tracked trades continues for a number of quarters following the tracked insider/institution sale and does not reverse within the sample period. Collectively, these results suggest that the information in tracked trades is important for fundamental firm value, and is only revealed following the information-rich dual trading by insiders and linked institutions.

When Anomalies Are Publicized Broadly, Do Institutions Trade Accordingly?

Paul Calluzzo
,
Queen's University
Fabio Moneta
,
Queen's University
Selim Topaloglu
,
Queen's University

Abstract

We study whether institutional investors trade on stock market anomalies. Using 14 well-documented anomalies, we observe an increase in anomaly-based trading when information about the anomalies is readily available through academic publication and the release of necessary accounting data. This finding is more pronounced among hedge funds and transient institutions, the subset of investors who likely have the ability and incentives to act on the anomalies. We directly relate the increase in trading to the observed decay in post-publication anomaly returns. Our findings support the role of institutional investors in the arbitrage process and in improving market efficiency.

Show Us Your Shorts!

Bige Kahraman
,
University of Oxford
Salil Pachare
,
Securities and Exchange Commission

Abstract

What is the impact of greater publicity in the shorting market on informational efficiency?
To answer this, we exploit rule amendments in U.S. securities markets which
increased the frequency of public disclosure of short interest. Greater publicity can
potentially improve or deteriorate informational efficiency. We find that with more
frequent disclosure, short-sellers’ private information is incorporated into prices faster,
improving informational efficiency. We also document significant market reactions to
short interest announcements, suggesting investor learning, and furthermore, increases
in short-sellers’ returns and reductions in their holding periods.

Inside Brokers

Weikai Li
,
Singapore Management University
Abhiroop Mukherjee
,
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Rik Sen
,
University of New South Wales

Abstract

We identify the broker each corporate insider trades through, and show that analysts and mutual fund managers affiliated with such "inside brokers" retain a substantial information advantage on the insider's firm, even after these trades are disclosed. Affiliated analysts issue 10-20% more accurate earnings forecasts, and affiliated funds trade the insider's stock much more profitably than their peers, following insider trades through their brokerage. Our results challenge the prevalent perception that information asymmetry arising from insider trading is acute only before trade disclosure, and suggest that brokers facilitating these trades are in a unique position to exploit such an asymmetry.
Discussant(s)
Kenneth Ahern
,
University of Southern California
David R. McLean
,
Georgetown University
Charles Jones
,
Columbia University
Brad Barber
,
University of California-Davis
JEL Classifications
  • G1 - General Financial Markets