Interactions Between Emissions Trading Systems and Other Policies: Insights from Theory and an Application to China
Abstract
Jurisdictions using emissions trading often combine this with other policies like renewable energy support and energy efficiency improvements. This overlap creates economic interactions, leading to outcomes that differ from those predicted by examining policies separately. Traditionally, research has focused on cap-and-trade (CAT) systems, where emissions are capped but prices vary. Recently, attention has shifted to rate-based emissions trading systems (ETS), where both emissions and prices are flexible, and the effects of policy interactions are less understood. This paper broadens the discussion to include various ETS types, such as tradable performance standards (TPS), alongside overlapping policies like renewable subsidies and electricity taxes. We provide analytical insights into how different ETS types respond to these overlaps. Using a numerical general equilibrium model, we analyze these dynamics in the context of China. Our findings show that while renewable subsidies have no impact on emissions under a CAT system, they increase emissions under a uniform TPS and decrease them under a TPS targeting high-emission sources.For CAT systems, additional renewable subsidies or electricity taxes introduce efficiency costs. However, under some TPS configurations, these policies can reduce market distortions and increase cost-effectiveness. Our model quantitatively evaluates how overlapping policies affect emissions, production, prices, and costs under China's planned ETS and alternative designs. China's existing policy overlaps significantly reduce the cost differential between its specific TPS and CAT, making CAT the most cost-effective in isolation. Rate-based systems benefit from indirect emissions pricing, improving price pass-through. Utilizing the TPS to achieve renewable targets can counteract distortions from differentiated benchmarks and effectively tax electricity without excessive correction, providing adequate incentives for clean producers. These results underscore the importance of jointly considering ETS type and overlapping policies in policy reforms to ensure effective and efficient environmental regulation.