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  5. Populism, Authoritarianism, and Illiberal Democracy
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Populism, Authoritarianism, and Illiberal Democracy

Paper Session

Sunday, Jan. 5, 2025 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (PST)

Hilton San Francisco Union Square, Continental Ballroom 9
Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chair: Assaf Razin, Tel Aviv University

Exporting the Surveillance State via Trade in AI

Martin Beraja
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Andrew Kao
,
Harvard University
David Yang
,
Harvard University
Noam Yuchtman
,
University of Oxford

Abstract

We document three facts about the global diffusion of surveillance AI technology, and in particular, the role played by China. First, China has a comparative advantage in this technology. It is substantially more likely to export surveillance AI than other countries, and particularly so as compared to other frontier technologies. Second, autocracies and weak democracies are more likely to import surveillance AI from China. This bias is not observed in AI imports from the US or in imports of other frontier technologies from China. Third, autocracies and weak democracies are especially more likely to import China’s surveillance AI in years of domestic unrest. Such imports coincide with declines in domestic institutional quality more broadly. To the extent that China may be exporting its surveillance state via trade in AI, this can enhance and beget more autocracies abroad. This possibility challenges the view that economic integration is necessarily associated with the diffusion of liberal institutions.

Populism and Economic Impacts of Regime Changes

Assaf Razin
,
Tel Aviv University
Efraim Sadka
,
Tel Aviv University

Abstract

The paper highlights the populistic and economic similarities and differences of the transition path from liberal democracy to illiberal democracy for Hungary, Poland and the 2023 judicial-overhaul attempt in Israel. Analysis overviews key economic structural changes, that are reinforced by the judicial overhaul, like crony capitalism, widespread rent-seeking, dearth of foreign direct investment, preferential-welfare-state transfers to privileged sectors, and suffocated entrepreneurship. They underscore the differential effects of the public resistance to the judicial overhaul, attempting to block the anti-democratic sweeping changes in the judicial systems Judicial overhaul package which weaken the independent standing of legal advisors in various government entities and public organizations generate a pathway to crony capitalism. Effects which impact growth foreign direct investment and technological progress are emphasized. Fundamental political polarization drivers are: Economic Disparities and Inequality, Ethnic-Cultural-Religious, Segregation, Quality of Education and Access Disparities, Identity Politics, Social Echo Chambers.

The Political Economy of Alternative Realities

Adam Szeidl
,
Central European University
Ferenc Szucs
,
Stockholm University

Abstract

We build a model in which a politician can persuade voters of a false alternative reality that serves to discredit the intellectual elite. In the alternative reality, elite members conspire to criticize the competence of a politician whose ideology they dislike. If believed, the alternative reality inverts the effect of the elite's message, so that criticism helps the politician. This force leads to reduced accountability, distrust in experts, and bad policies that invite elite criticism. Alternative realities feature conspiracies which solve a collective action problem, evolve in response to evidence, and create demand for new media that reinforce them.

Decomposing the Rise of the Populist Radical Right

Oren Danieli
,
Tel Aviv University
Noam Gidron
,
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Ro'ee Levy
,
Tel Aviv University
Shinnosuke Kikuchi
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Abstract

Support for populist radical right parties in Europe has dramatically increased in recent years. We decompose the rise of these parties from 2005 to 2020 into four components: shifts in party positions, changes in voter attributes (opinions and demographics), changes in voter priorities, and a residual. We merge two wide datasets on party positions and voter attributes and estimate voter priorities using a probabilistic voting model. We find that shifts in party positions and changes in voter attributes do not play a major role in the recent success of populist radical right parties. Instead, the primary driver behind their electoral success lies in voters’ changing priorities. Particularly, voters are less likely to decide which party to support based on parties’ economic positions. Rather, voters—mainly older, nonunionized, low-educated men—increasingly prioritize nativist cultural positions. This allows populist radical right parties to tap into a preexisting reservoir of culturally conservative voters. Using the same datasets, we provide a set of reduced-form evidence supporting our results. First, while parties’ positions have changed, these changes are not consistent with the main supply-side hypothesis for populist support. Second, on aggregate, voters have not adopted populist right-wing opinions. Third, voters are more likely to self-identify ideologically based on their cultural rather than their economic opinions.

Discussant(s)
Assaf Razin
,
Tel Aviv University
Ferenc Szucs
,
Stockholm University
Ro'ee Levy
,
Tel Aviv University
Noam Yuchtman
,
University of Oxford
JEL Classifications
  • P0 - General