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Health Economics: Information, Incentives, and Insurance

Paper Session

Monday, Jan. 4, 2027 12:30 PM - 2:15 PM (EST)

Grand Hyatt Washington
Hosted By: Health Economics Research Organization
  • Chair: Brad Rice, Analysis Group

Effects of Point-of-Prescribing Price Transparency: Evidence from Real-Time Benefit Tools

Olivia Zhao
,
Harvard University
Anna Sinaiko
,
Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health

Abstract

Cost-sharing on prescription drugs can present meaningful barriers to patient access and adherence to prescribed treatments. Even for prescribers who would take cost-sharing into consideration when making therapeutic recommendations, limited knowledge of encounter-specific factors like a patient’s benefit design or deductible spending make it difficult for prescribers to incorporate cost-sharing in their decisions. One possible solution are real-time benefit tools (RTBTs), which operate at the time of prescribing by displaying cost-sharing for medication orders and possible therapeutic substitutes with lower cost-sharing. We studied the 2019 implementation of an RTBT on antihyperglycemic prescribing to treat diabetes and obesity at a large academic health system. Using a difference-in-differences design comparing prescribers exposed to the RTBT to other prescribers in the same state, we causally estimated a $1.55 decrease in monthly cost-sharing following RTBT implementation, representing an 8.7 percent decrease. Decomposing this aggregate result into different prescribing patterns, we found that the result is entirely driven by reductions in insulin cost-sharing, with no detectable changes in prescribing patterns across antihyperglycemics subclasses or within non-insulin subclasses. The non-uniform effect of RTBTs across all therapeutic options may be a function of differences in price dispersion and clinical substitutability within and across subclasses. We interpret this as evidence of the potential for RTBTs to lower cost-sharing, but caution that RTBTs may not be uniformly successful at achieving savings for patients across the wide range of therapeutic areas represented in most clinical settings.

Common Ownership and Risk Selection in Medicare Part D

Jaehak Lee
,
University of Albany
Chun-Yu Ho
,
University of Albany
Pinka Chatterji
,
University of Albany

Abstract

Common ownership has become a defining feature of U.S. public firms, raising concerns that overlapping owners soften market competition. Evidence from health insurance remains limited despite the policy stakes. We study Medicare Part D, where common ownership among insurers is substantial and rising and where risk selection gives insurers a countervailing incentive to attract lower-cost enrollees. The paper asks whether common ownership shifts insurer pricing in this market and how the answer depends on risk selection.

Informative Ordeals in Healthcare: Prior Authorization of Drugs in Medicaid

Ljubica Ristovska
,
University of Texas-Austin
Samantha Burn
,
Imperial College London

Abstract

Health insurers frequently impose supply-side policies in the form of ‘prior authorization’ to manage healthcare spending. Prior authorization requires providers to fill out paperwork before treatment is eligible for coverage. The stated purpose of these policies is to reduce healthcare spending by encouraging the use of lower-cost treatments of similar quality, and to ensure treatment complies with established guidelines. However, there are concerns that prior authorization may discourage needed care. Using all-payer claims data from Massachusetts in 2009-2013, we estimate the effect of prior authorization on the use of specific drugs in MassHealth, the state Medicaid fee-for-service program. Using difference-in-differences estimation, we compare Medicaid beneficiaries affected by changes in prior authorization requirements to individuals in plans of a major commercial insurer unaffected by these policy changes. We find that prior authorizations lead to large reductions in utilization of drugs that have clear substitutes. These reductions are fully offset by increases in utilization of cheaper but equally effective drugs. However, when clear substitutes are not available, there are reductions in utilization that do not lead to substitution to similar drugs. Prior authorization reduces both high- and low-value use of drugs, suggesting that it is not well targeted.

Mandating Transparency: Evidence from Hospital Price Disclosure

Tong Guo
,
Duke University
Xinyao Kong
,
Indiana University Bloomington
Yanwen Wang
,
University of British Columbia

Abstract

We study the causal impact of state-mandated hospital price disclosure on negotiated billing prices between healthcare providers and insurers. Using ten years of claims data from the Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI), we examine the price variations around the launches of Massachusetts and North Carolina's public price-comparison websites between 2015 and 2018. These websites disclosed insurer-specific procedure prices at the provider level, substantially increasing transparency in healthcare pricing at an unprecedented level of granularity, while prices in nearby states remained largely opaque. Exploiting this quasi-experimental variation in the availability of price information in a difference-in-differences framework, we find that mandated disclosure leads to sizable price increases for outpatient imaging procedures: approximately $55–$170 in Massachusetts and $17–$98 in North Carolina within three years of implementation. Price dispersion within regional healthcare markets declines in North Carolina while remaining stable in Massachusetts. In markets characterized by greater provider concentration, price increases are significantly larger. Insurers absorb over 70% of price increases in MA and almost 100% in NC, limiting pass-through to patients. Our findings highlight that mandated transparency does not necessarily lower prices; instead, it may facilitate price coordination at higher levels, with important implications for the national implementation of hospital price transparency policies.

Discussant(s)
Lynn Hua
,
Georgia State University
Christopher Ody
,
Analysis Group
David Rosenkranz
,
Fordham University
Chris Whaley
,
Brown University
JEL Classifications
  • I1 - Health