Health Economics: Information, Incentives, and Insurance
Paper Session
Monday, Jan. 4, 2027 12:30 PM - 2:15 PM (EST)
- Chair: Brad Rice, Analysis Group
Common Ownership and Risk Selection in Medicare Part D
Abstract
Common ownership has become a defining feature of U.S. public firms, raising concerns that overlapping owners soften market competition. Evidence from health insurance remains limited despite the policy stakes. We study Medicare Part D, where common ownership among insurers is substantial and rising and where risk selection gives insurers a countervailing incentive to attract lower-cost enrollees. The paper asks whether common ownership shifts insurer pricing in this market and how the answer depends on risk selection.Informative Ordeals in Healthcare: Prior Authorization of Drugs in Medicaid
Abstract
Health insurers frequently impose supply-side policies in the form of ‘prior authorization’ to manage healthcare spending. Prior authorization requires providers to fill out paperwork before treatment is eligible for coverage. The stated purpose of these policies is to reduce healthcare spending by encouraging the use of lower-cost treatments of similar quality, and to ensure treatment complies with established guidelines. However, there are concerns that prior authorization may discourage needed care. Using all-payer claims data from Massachusetts in 2009-2013, we estimate the effect of prior authorization on the use of specific drugs in MassHealth, the state Medicaid fee-for-service program. Using difference-in-differences estimation, we compare Medicaid beneficiaries affected by changes in prior authorization requirements to individuals in plans of a major commercial insurer unaffected by these policy changes. We find that prior authorizations lead to large reductions in utilization of drugs that have clear substitutes. These reductions are fully offset by increases in utilization of cheaper but equally effective drugs. However, when clear substitutes are not available, there are reductions in utilization that do not lead to substitution to similar drugs. Prior authorization reduces both high- and low-value use of drugs, suggesting that it is not well targeted.Mandating Transparency: Evidence from Hospital Price Disclosure
Abstract
We study the causal impact of state-mandated hospital price disclosure on negotiated billing prices between healthcare providers and insurers. Using ten years of claims data from the Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI), we examine the price variations around the launches of Massachusetts and North Carolina's public price-comparison websites between 2015 and 2018. These websites disclosed insurer-specific procedure prices at the provider level, substantially increasing transparency in healthcare pricing at an unprecedented level of granularity, while prices in nearby states remained largely opaque. Exploiting this quasi-experimental variation in the availability of price information in a difference-in-differences framework, we find that mandated disclosure leads to sizable price increases for outpatient imaging procedures: approximately $55–$170 in Massachusetts and $17–$98 in North Carolina within three years of implementation. Price dispersion within regional healthcare markets declines in North Carolina while remaining stable in Massachusetts. In markets characterized by greater provider concentration, price increases are significantly larger. Insurers absorb over 70% of price increases in MA and almost 100% in NC, limiting pass-through to patients. Our findings highlight that mandated transparency does not necessarily lower prices; instead, it may facilitate price coordination at higher levels, with important implications for the national implementation of hospital price transparency policies.Discussant(s)
Lynn Hua
,
Georgia State University
Christopher Ody
,
Analysis Group
David Rosenkranz
,
Fordham University
Chris Whaley
,
Brown University
JEL Classifications
- I1 - Health