What Economic Models Can and Cannot See: Human Flourishing, Freedom, and the Common Good
Paper Session
Sunday, Jan. 3, 2027 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM (EST)
- Chair: Sarah Hamersma, Syracuse University
Can Market Design Make Us More Free? Some Notes on the Use of Experimental Economics from the Perspective of Theological Anthropology
Abstract
Although modern thought tends to construe freedom as freedom from constraint or freedom of choice, Catholic theological anthropology has long defined true freedom as the state of being agentially oriented toward the good. As Servais Pinckaers puts it, it is “freedom for,” rather than “freedom from”—specifically, freedom for living in a Christ-like way, which becomes possible as we come to participate in Christ’s character. This perspective suggests that social influences which encourage our growth in character are not only helping us become more good, but also more free. Moreover, because this conception of freedom is not based in autonomy, this remains true even if these formative influences are not chosen by us, and work on us without our awareness.Using this concept of freedom, this paper considers the theological implications of experimental research on prosocial behavior in markets. It appears that certain conditions encourage subjects to act with more fairness, trustworthiness, and even generosity than they might under other conditions. (E.g., when market participants can observe each other’s behavior and communicate, and when the social framing of various options emphasizes values, or at least does not emphasize competition or the threat of loss, among other factors.) Insofar as laboratory studies replicate conditions present in actual markets, this indicates that some real markets elicit more moral behaviors than others.
Moreover, because virtue theory assumes that character is built through repeated moral action, markets which encourage individuals to act in prosocial ways can be read as supporting their growth in virtue, insofar as these elicited actions eventually influence individuals’ dispositions and habits. To the extent that this occurs, this paper proposes that good market design can encourage us to become more good, and thus more free.
What Will It Take to Model the Common Good?
Abstract
The common good is a foundational moral concept in Catholic social thought, but is difficult to model and measure in individualistic economic theoretical frameworks. There is value, however, in the attempt to include the social nature of human beings in economics. How we model preferences affects the kinds of questions we ask, which phenomena we attempt to measure, and how we evaluate observed economic outcomes. Taking Russell Hittinger’s description of “common goods” and “The common good” as a description of the phenomenon to be modelled, this paper will discuss how standard economic models might be modified to include “The common good.” The paper will evaluate the literature on altruism, reciprocity, and civil economy as sources for modelling insight.Wagering on Paradox Goods
Abstract
This paper develops the concept of paradox goods: goods that are economically generative precisely when pursued as ends, yet which corrode when pursued instrumentally as means to profit. Trust, authentic purpose, stewardship, fiduciary restraint, and meaningful work are examples of goods whose productive power depends on perceived intent, authenticity, and non-instrumental commitment. Building on Quinn and Thakor’s (2018, 2019) paradox of purpose, we argue that such goods expose a blind spot in standard financial economics.The paper proceeds in three steps. First, it situates paradox goods within a broader philosophical account of human goods, drawing on the classical tradition and contemporary virtue ethics to argue that some goods are neither reducible to preference satisfaction nor intelligible as mere means. Second, it examines the economic properties of paradox goods, showing why they are belief-mediated, authenticity-dependent, and non-contractible, and why their value-generating effects often disappear under instrumental governance. Third, it traces a historical “path of forgetting” through which finance moved from a conditional and highly restricted welfare framework to a generalized shareholder-centered model that rendered paradox goods either invisible or unintelligible.
The paper then engages a representative skeptic of paradox goods through a Pascal-style wager. Even a firm uncertain about the reality of such goods may have prudential reason to govern as if they are real, because the upside of sustaining high-cooperation equilibria can exceed the foregone gains from opportunistic extraction or instrumental profit maximization. This wager, however, leads to a second-order problem: how agents formed by instrumental logics become capable of non-instrumental commitment. We conclude by arguing that ownership forms, governance structures, and organizational practices function as moral
Discussant(s)
Erik Matson
,
George Mason University
Steve McMullen
,
Hope College
JEL Classifications
- B4 - Economic Methodology