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From Fiscal Policy to Investment

Paper Session

Sunday, Jan. 3, 2027 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (EST)

Marriott Marquis Washington DC
Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chair: Kenneth Rogoff, Harvard University

Guns and Butter: The Fiscal Consequences of Rearmament and War

Christoph Trebesch
,
Kiel Institute and CEPR
Johannes Marzian
,
Kiel Institute for the World Economy

Abstract

We study the fiscal consequences of large military buildups. To do so, we assemble the Global Budget Database, a comprehensive dataset of disaggregated central government finances for 20 countries from 1870 to 2022. We identify 114 episodes of military spending booms, in peace and war, and analyze their financing and long-term fiscal legacy. Consistent with theory, war-time booms are financed primarily through debt, while peacetime booms rely on a more balanced mix of debt and taxes. In contrast to the classic notion of “guns versus butter”, we find little evidence that social spending is cut during military expansions. Instead, when societies rearm, they tend to choose guns and butter, resulting in higher debt, expenditures, and taxes. Debt rises and later falls, but tax rates and tax revenues remain elevated for 15 years or more. Large geopolitical shocks, in war and peace, result in higher taxes and a lasting fiscal expansion.

When Less is More: Debt Reduction and Investment

M. Ayhan Kose
,
World Bank, Brookings Institution, and CEPR
Franziska Ohnsorge
,
World Bank and CEPR
Hayley Pallan
,
World Bank
Ugo Panizza
,
Geneva Graduate Institute and CEPR

Abstract

The past two decades have been marked by extraordinary government debt runups and private investment weakness. Will efforts to rein in government debt unleash private investment? Using both country-level and firm-level data, we document three key findings. First, government debt reductions are associated with significantly higher private investment--and investment rises most when government debt reduction avoids macroeconomic disruptions. Second, government debt reductions crowd in firm-level investment, especially among firms with weak cash flow and when credit conditions improve. Third, firm investment is less responsive to credit constraints during periods of large government debt reduction--suggesting that loosening credit constraints are a mechanism for the country-level result. The country-level results are robust to alternative samples and specifications. The firm-level results are robust to alternative country samples, various proxies of credit constraints, and controlling for macroeconomic channels that could influence firm investment when government debt declines--such as strong GDP growth or an improvement in sovereign credit ratings.

From Debt Reset to Growth Onset? Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Firm Performance in Developing Countries

Marin Ferry
,
Université Gustave Eiffel
Luc Jacolin
,
Banque de France
Quentin Dufresne
,
Banque de France

Abstract

Leveraging a unique dataset that combines country-level information on debt restructuring with firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) spanning from 2004 to 2023, we analyze the effects of debt restructuring on firm sales growth. Using recent advancements in difference-in-differences estimation to account for the staggered implementation of restructurings, we find that sovereign debt restructuring increases firm performance by 5–9 percentage points, with stronger effects for private, domestically-owned firms and those reliant on public and financial services. The impact varies by debt type (domestic or external), creditor composition, and implementation speed. Swift external restructurings led by official creditors, such as the Paris Club, yield the most substantial positive effects, whereas other types of restructurings show no significant impact on private sector growth.

The Austerity Threshold

Vadim Elenev
,
Johns Hopkins University
Tim Landvoigt
,
University of Pennsylvania
Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
,
Columbia Business School

Abstract

We introduce a new indicator of fiscal capacity—the “austerity threshold”: the debt-to-GDP level above which the government must raise fiscal surpluses to ensure debt safety. In a model with realistic risk premia, nominal rigidities, and an intermediary sector, calibrated to the U.S., we estimate this threshold at 189%. We highlight the roles of safety premia and intermediation-driven convenience yields. The threshold varies with the source of surpluses: spending cuts reduce inflation and allow low interest rates, while tax increases distort labor supply and raise inflation. Uncertainty over the austerity regime – spending cuts or tax increases – sharply lowers fiscal capacity. The expected austerity regime affects asset prices and macro outcomes even when debt-to-GDP is well below the threshold.

Discussant(s)
Sarah Zubairy
,
Texas A&M University
Laura Alfaro
,
Inter-American Development Bank
Graciela Kaminsky
,
George Washington University
Eric Leeper
,
University of Virginia
JEL Classifications
  • E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
  • O1 - Economic Development