Agriculture and the Environment
Paper Session
Saturday, Jan. 3, 2026 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (EST)
- Chair: Philip Mulder, University of Wisconsin-Madison
The Moral Hazard—Environmental Externalities Dilemma in Subsidized Crop Insurance: Evidence from Water Quality in China
Abstract
Whether crop insurance exacerbates environmental pollution remains the subject of long-standing debate. In this study, we exploit China’s recent rollout of full cost insurance (FCI) and planting revenue insurance (PRI) for the three major staple crops—rice, maize, and wheat—as a quasi-natural experiment to examine how a substantial increase in coverage levels affects surface-water quality. We provide mixed evidence. On the positive side, following the policy implementation, average concentrations of total nitrogen (TN) and total phosphorus (TP) in surface waters around pilot counties significantly declined. In regions with higher climate risk and higher historical insurance payout rates, these reductions are observed more rapidly. However, water quality did not improve everywhere: different insurance designs yield sharply different environmental impacts. By indemnifying pre-specified production costs, FCI reduces water pollution by weakening farmers’ incentives to use chemical inputs, albeit at the cost of modest yield reductions. By compensating on the basis of regional average yields and market prices, PRI mitigates moral hazard by aligning production incentives with income stabilization, but it encourages production intensification—greater fertilizer application and higher yields—thereby increasing nutrient-runoff pressures. Future policy design should explicitly weigh the tension between moral hazard and environmental sustainability.Discussant(s)
Prakash Mishra
,
University of Pennsylvania
Philip Mulder
,
University of Wisconsin-Madison
JEL Classifications
- Q1 - Agriculture
- Q5 - Environmental Economics