Who Gets What and Why: Experiments on Bargaining and Negotiation
Paper Session
Monday, Jan. 5, 2026 1:00 PM - 3:00 PM (EST)
- Chair: Topi Miettinen, Hanken School of Economics
The Impact of the Menstrual Cycle on Bargaining Behavior
Abstract
We investigate experimentally how the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and bargaining outcomes of women. Female participants negotiate in an unstructured bilateral bargaining game with asymmetric information about the allocation of a surplus (’pie size’). We find that the menstrual cycle affects bargaining behavior and that the effects depend on players’ information. Players who are informed about the pie size are less compromising during ovulation and receive higher payoffs conditional on reaching an agreement. Uninformed players achieve higher final payoffs during ovulation, which is mainly driven by higher agreement rates. Our study provides first evidence that biological factors affect bargaining.Coordination and Bargaining in Weakest-link Games
Abstract
Coordination problems are often modeled as weakest-link games, where agents contribute expecting to receive an equal share of the surplus. However, in many real-life scenarios, agents bargain over the final division of the surplus. The effect of such bargaining is a priori unclear: bargaining allows groups to punish under-contributing members but also introduces uncertainty about contribution returns. We present evidence from two experiments showing ex post bargaining substantially improves coordination prospects as groups favor equitable divisions of the surplus even though interactions are not repeated. Female groups favor more inclusive, equitable divisions than male groups without undermining incentives to coordinate.Bargaining on an Uneven Playing Field: Experiments with Asymmetry in Information and Payoffs from Disagreement
Abstract
We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining when one player has private information about both the value of an agreement and disagreement payoffs. We show that the informed player's “capacity to pay” - the difference between agreement value and their disagreement payoff - is key: Agreement is more likely, and payments are higher when the capacity to pay is greater. These outcomes are facilitated by the transmission of private information through informed players’ choices and reflected in those of uninformed players. Additionally, players use fairness norms that would be irrelevant under full information but are otherwise incentive-compatible. Both parties typically earn lower payoffs in informative outcomes compared to uninformative ones due to higher disagreement rates.Timely Negotiations
Abstract
Deadlines often disrupt negotiations and lead to unwanted impasses, yet how to mitigate these effects is still an open question. We conduct a laboratory experiment to identify mechanisms that reduce bargaining impasses. Theoretical predictions suggest that uncertain deadlines—where the timing of the deadline is not fixed but follows a probabilistic process—should improve negotiation outcomes by limiting strategic posturing. Empirically, we find a non-monotonic relationship: small amounts of deadline uncertainty increase impasse rates, while both fixed deadlines and high uncertainty perform better. Next, allowing for range offers—proposals that specify a range of acceptable prices—reduces negotiation breakdowns by softening the aggressive anchoring typical in bargaining. These effects persist under both complete and private information conditions. In contrast, informational nudges aimed at promoting equal-sharing norms or emphasizing risks associated with delaying agreements fail to improve negotiation outcomes. Our results suggest that structural design choices, such as deadline certainty and flexible offer formats, have a stronger impact on negotiation success than informational interventions.Discussant(s)
Junya Zhou
,
University of Texas at Dallas
Chloe Tergiman
,
Pennsylvania State University
Ala Avoyan
,
Indiana University
Olivier Bochet
,
New York University-Abu Dhabi
Topi Miettinen
,
Hanken School of Economics
JEL Classifications
- C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C9 - Design of Experiments