Targeting and Program Take-Up
Paper Session
Monday, Jan. 5, 2026 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (EST)
- Chair: Charlie Rafkin, University of British Columbia
Targeting, Screening, and Retention: Evidence from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program in California
Abstract
Many households eligible for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program do not enroll. Using enrollment histories for all participants in California between 2005 and 2023, this paper documents how eligibility screens lower retention and contribute to incomplete take-up. Enrollment spells largely coincide with reporting schedules, and the majority of cases that leave are eligible before and after their exit. At the same time, reporting requirements improve targeting, deterring at higher rates recipients who appear more advantaged. The paper concludes that reducing the frequency of these verifications can efficiently improve participation, despite worse targeting, because these ordeals are so costly to administer.Self-Targeting in U.S. Transfer Programs
Abstract
This paper examines a classic rationale for voluntary take-up over automatic enrollment in transfer programs: Take-up may be advantageously “self-targeted” on characteristics that are infeasible to use as eligibility criteria. Using a correlation test, we find self-targeting in eight U.S. transfers: on average, recipients have lower consumption and lifetime incomes than similar eligible nonrecipients. Self-targeting focuses redistribution toward the lifetime poor and also increases transfers’ within-lifetime insurance value. With a new sufficient-statistics result, we value the social benefits of self-targeting at approximately nine cents per transfer dollar, offsetting the social costs of take-up in some programs.Targeting Subsidies Through Price Menus: Menu Design and Evidence from Clean Fuels
Abstract
We examine the feasibility of targeting subsidies using non-linear pricing. We consider a policy maker who wants to increase the use of cleaner cooking fuel, while keeping the subsidy budget low by targeting subsidies to more price sensitive individuals. Fuel is sold in cylinders (packages) of different sizes, allowing for size-differentiated pricing, but not limits on the frequency of purchase. We demonstrate implementation in two stages: (1) we gather the empirical inputs for a sufficient statistic based approach to menu design, and then (2) test the optimal non-linear price menu against counterfactual linear pricing. Relative to the counterfactual, allocating more of the subsidy to purchases in the smaller package size achieves the same level of LPG demand with 30% less in public expenditure. We show, both empirically and theoretically, that intuitive conditions -- namely transaction costs and savings constraints -- generate frictions that sustain a separating equilibrium even when the smaller package is more heavily subsidized. Because poorer households have a preference for smaller sized purchases, this non-linear price menu is also progressive.JEL Classifications
- H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
- I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty